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COMMENT
RECASTING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE’S NET
Zach Huffman*
INTRODUCTION
The summer of 2020 thrust the relationship between law enforcement and
racial minorities squarely into this country’s collective consciousness. After
witnessing horrible instances of police misconduct, large portions of the U.S.
population called for reforms, from abolishing the police1 to revoking legal
doctrines like qualified immunity.2 However, operating behind these visible
debates are rules that arguably unfairly tip the scales in favor of the police
and effectively make racial minorities vulnerable to unjustifiable coercion at
the hands of law enforcement.3
One such doctrine is the exclusionary rule. At first glance the rule seems
to protect individuals, not assist police—it directs courts to exclude evidence,
in certain circumstances, if evidence introduced at trial was obtained through
a violation of the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.4 But in Herring v.
United States,5 the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the circumstances in which
the exclusionary rule applies, limiting it to situations involving “reckless,
deliberate, or grossly negligent conduct,” or to “recurring or systemic
negligence.”6 Herring effectively eroded any meaningful protection that the
exclusionary rule once offered;7 the rule is now extremely forgiving of police
misbehavior.

* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of Law; A.M., 2015, University of
Chicago; A.B., 2014, Princeton University. Thank you to the Fordham Law Review editors
for their careful review and commitment to this Comment.
1. See Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES
(June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-defundpolice.html [https://perma.cc/G7H3-KGQ9].
2. See Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Opinion, The One Police Reform That Both the Left and
the Right Support, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
06/02/opinion/breonna-taylor-police.html [https://perma.cc/F8JX-CL4B].
3. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 59-96 (rev. ed. 2012) (discussing how features of the U.S.
criminal justice system impact racial minorities).
4. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83 (1976).
5. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
6. See id. at 144.
7. See id. at 156 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Herring has had significant impact on minorities. The disproportionately
high rate of interactions between minorities and law enforcement places
minorities at higher risk of suffering violations to their constitutional rights
due to police misconduct.8 Without a robust exclusionary rule, minorities
have few, if any, mechanisms to remedy the wrongs they have experienced.9
And even when the exclusionary rule can be invoked, access to justice issues
make it difficult for minorities to win on their colorable claims.10
While Herring has erected significant obstacles for minorities attempting
to vindicate their constitutional rights, those obstacles are not unassailable.
As public attention imposes pressure for reform, litigants may look to address
other legal doctrines like qualified immunity, the downstream effect of which
would be better compliance with the Fourth Amendment.11 Litigants could
also advocate for recalibrating the exclusionary rule by asking courts to
broaden the number of circumstances in which the exclusionary rule
applies.12 Finally, litigants may begin to chip away at the outer limits of
Herring by drilling down on what the Court meant by asserting that the
exclusionary rule applies in instances of “deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic
negligence.”13
Part I explains the exclusionary rule. It begins with the theoretical basis
for the rule, then describes how the rule traditionally functioned, and
concludes by discussing how Herring changed the legal landscape. Part II
explains why Herring is particularly problematic for minorities looking to
vindicate their constitutional rights. Part III explores three avenues of
reform.
PART I: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause.”14 Notably absent in the amendment,
however, is a remedy to provide redress when these rights are violated or to
ensure the rights are upheld in the first instance. To fill this gap, the U.S.
Supreme Court fashioned the exclusionary rule as a remedy providing
criminal defendants the opportunity at trial to suppress evidence collected as
the result of a Fourth Amendment violation.15 Without this rule, “the
protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value.”16

8. See infra Part II.
9. Herring, 555 U.S. at 156 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part III.
13. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144; see also infra Part III.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Claire Angelique Nolasco et al., What Herring Hath Wrought: An Analysis of PostHerring Cases in the Federal Courts, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 222 (2011).
16. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
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Perhaps counterintuitively, the rule exists not to redress the particular
Fourth Amendment violation the defendant suffered, but rather to “deter
future unlawful police conduct.”17 This is because using the tainted evidence
at trial is not a constitutional violation—the defective search or seizure is.18
Thus, whether evidence can be excluded at trial is a separate issue from
whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.19
Because the
exclusionary rule is not meant to make any one particular individual whole
by remedying the constitutional wrong, the rule applies only in those
situations where it will actually work: when deterring unlawful police
conduct is achievable.20
To determine whether deterrence is possible, courts undertake a “rigorous
weighing” of costs and benefits,21 balancing the likelihood of deterring the
future bad act with the substantial societal cost of excluding probative
evidence from trial and potentially allowing a guilty person to go free.22 If
the likelihood of deterrence is “appreciable,” the tainted evidence will be
excluded; however, if deterrence is unlikely, exclusion is not warranted, and
the evidence is admitted.23 By this logic, if the officer would have violated
a constitutional right even with the threat of exclusion looming, then
deterrence is unattainable, the cost of letting the guilty go free is too high,
and, accordingly, the exclusionary rule does not apply.
This model should ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment.
Society has an interest in law enforcement abiding by the Constitution and
an interest in punishing the guilty. Letting the guilty go free because of
excluded evidence should deter officers—who have an interest in “locking
away bad guys”24—from committing errors. Thus, officers will endeavor to
follow the Constitution to keep guilty persons from avoiding punishment.
The exclusionary rule, then, ensures that both societal interests are met.
Refining this idea further, the Court has constructed an exception
identifying when deterrence is not achievable. This good faith exception
explains that “illegally obtained evidence is admissible in court despite the
existence of any error or mistake, ‘as long as the error or mistake was not
committed by the police, or, if committed by the police, the error or mistake
was honest and reasonable.’”25 The exception seems to be congruent with
the exclusionary rule’s theoretical basis in deterrence—excluding evidence
will not deter law enforcement officers from committing constitutional
violations if the officers believed they themselves acted reasonably or if they
relied upon others whose actions the officers had no reason to suspect were
17. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
18. See id. at 353–54.
19. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
223 (1983)).
20. Id. at 11.
21. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011).
22. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987).
23. Davis, 564 U.S. at 237 (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).
24. Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO.
L.J. 1077, 1083 (2011).
25. Nolasco et al., supra note 15, at 222 (citation omitted).
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unconstitutional.26 In short, deterrence only works if the law enforcement
officials knew or should have known their behavior was inappropriate.27
A trilogy of cases demonstrates how the good faith exception operates. In
United States v. Leon,28 the Court held that the good faith exception applied
when police officers relied on a facially valid, but defective warrant issued
by a magistrate to carry out a search, concluding that the costs of excluding
“inherently trustworthy tangible evidence” outweighed the possible benefits
of deterrence.29 The exclusionary rule was inapplicable here because (1) the
rule was meant to deter police, not magistrates; (2) there was no evidence
that judges or magistrates were “inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth
Amendment,” so “the extreme sanction of exclusion” was not required to
ensure that magistrates followed the law; and (3) applying the exclusionary
rule here would not deter future misconduct by judges or magistrates issuing
search warrants.30 In essence, the police reasonably relied on the conduct of
a non-law enforcement officer—the magistrate. Excluding evidence would
punish the wrong audience—judges, not police—and would not alter any
future conduct because police would continue to rely upon the probable cause
determination of judges.
Leon’s logic appears clearly in the next two cases of the trilogy. In Illinois
v. Krull,31 the good faith exception applied when an officer relied on a state
statute later declared to be unconstitutional.32 The Court noted that exclusion
would have minimal deterrent effect because the officer “simply fulfilled his
responsibility to enforce the statute as written.”33 And like magistrates, the
Court found no reason to believe exclusion would successfully ensure that
legislators wrote constitutional statutes.34 Similarly, in Arizona v. Evans,35
the good faith exception applied to officers’ reliance on “erroneous computer
record[s]” maintained by court officials.36 Again deploying Leon, the Court
found no evidence that court employees are “inclined to ignore or subvert the
Fourth Amendment” or that exclusion would deter future court employee
misconduct.37 Finally, there was no indication that exclusion would deter
the arresting officer either—officers would continue to rely on records
produced by court staffs.38
Despite this established case law, the Court’s decision in Herring appears
to have significantly altered the good faith exception. The facts of the case
26. See id.
27. Tort law can be seen as a corollary to the exclusionary rule. See Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 153 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
29. Id. at 907.
30. Id. at 915–17.
31. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
32. Id. at 355–57.
33. Id. at 350.
34. Id. at 351.
35. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 11 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987)).
38. Id. at 15–16.
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are well rehearsed. In July 2004, Bennie Dean Herring arrived at the Coffee
County, Alabama Sherriff’s Department to retrieve items from his
impounded truck.39 Investigator Mark Anderson learned that Herring was at
the department, and knowing that Herring had a criminal record, asked the
county’s warrant clerk to check for any outstanding warrants naming
Herring.40 When the clerk found none, she contacted her colleague in
neighboring Dale County, who determined that Dale County indeed had an
outstanding warrant for Herring’s arrest.41 Armed with this information,
Anderson arrested Herring as he left the department and found him in
possession of drugs and a pistol.42 However, the Dale County clerk had made
a mistake.43 As Herring was being stopped in Coffee County, the Dale
County clerk realized there was an error with the record—Herring’s warrant
had been recalled five months earlier.44 The realization occurred too late—
Herring had already been arrested.45
Upon first glance, it appears like the exclusionary rule should have applied.
Unlike in the trilogy discussed above, here police conduct was defective.
Nevertheless, the Court found that the good faith exception applied.46
Affirming Leon and its progeny, the Court recognized that the exclusionary
rule is triggered when exclusion meaningfully deters future bad conduct.47
But apparently breaking with precedent, the Court added a heightened fault
requirement, writing that “the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or
systemic negligence.”48 Errors resulting from “nonrecurring and attenuated
negligence [are too] far removed from the core concerns that” led to the rule’s
adoption.49 Finding no evidence that the police were reckless in relying on
the incorrect record or that there was systemic negligence in maintaining the
database, Herring’s motion to suppress was denied.50
Although the Court couched its opinion as an incremental extension of the
rule, scholars have noted a number of reasons why Herring is a significant
change.51 First, before Herring, the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence
had never required “a showing of heightened misconduct”52 by incorporating
39. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 138.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 138–39.
47. See id. 147–48.
48. Id. at 144.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 147–48.
51. There is extensive scholarship on Herring and the exclusionary rule more generally.
For a more complete discussion, see generally, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring:
A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009).
52. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 671 (2011).

104

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 89

a form of mens rea into the deterrence calculus.53 No longer would mere
negligence be enough to trigger the exclusionary rule because, in the Court’s
opinion, such low levels of fault cannot be meaningfully deterred.54
According to some commentators, Herring severely diluted the rule by
“effectively narrow[ing] [it] to evidence obtained only pursuant to systemic
negligence and to flagrant and reckless violations of the Fourth
Amendment.”55 Second, pre-Herring, the good faith exception applied to
“evidence illegally obtained by police officers in ‘objectively reasonable
reliance’ on errors committed by nonlaw-enforcement personnel.”56 But in
Herring, the Court applied the exception to an error committed by the police
and thereby broke down the law enforcement/non-law enforcement
distinction central to the Court’s previous holdings. At bottom, Herring’s
cabining of the exclusionary rule has left most violations of the Fourth
Amendment without a remedy.57
PART II: HERRING AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES
Herring has potentially far-reaching consequences,58 which will not be felt
evenly throughout the population. Like many Fourth Amendment doctrines,
Herring’s revamped good faith exception may disproportionately impact
minority communities, who disproportionately interact with law
enforcement, and thus will be disproportionately subjected to the errors that
law enforcement officials inevitably commit. Statistics on law enforcement
interactions show that minorities are involved in all stages of the criminal
justice system more than they should be based on their share of the total
population.59 According to data from 2015, Black people make up 18 percent
of individuals stopped by police, while only accounting for 12 percent of the
total population.60 Data reflecting interactions with police in New York City
between 2014 and 2017 show that Black people accounted for 53 percent of
stops, Latinx people 28 percent, and white people 11 percent.61 Similarly, in

53. Kerr, supra note 24, at 1105.
54. Laurin, supra note 52, at 682. This does not seem to comport with deterrence in other
contexts, most notably torts. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
55. Nolasco et al., supra note 15, at 224 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 223 (first citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921-22 (1984); then citing
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1987)).
57. See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 463 (2009).
58. See generally, e.g., Kay L. Levine et al., Evidence Laundering in a Post-Herring
World, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 627 (2017) (describing how evidence tainted by a
constitutional violation is “laundered” as it passes from the offending officer to a second
officer to, ultimately, the prosecutor).
59. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 97–139 (arguing why crime rates cannot explain this
incongruence).
60. Wendy Sawyer, Visualizing the Racial Disparities in Mass Incarceration, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 27, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/07/27/disparities/
[https://perma.cc/2JQ8-JKYT].
61. CHRISTOPHER DUNN & MICHELLE SHAMES, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-ANDFRISK
IN
THE
DE
BLASIO
ERA
9
(2019),
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Washington, D.C., 72 percent of individuals stopped are Black, despite
accounting for only 46 percent of D.C.’s population.62
Numbers on arrests and prison sentences tell a similar story. According to
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),
while Black and Latinx people together only represent 32 percent of the total
U.S. population, they represent 56 percent of the country’s incarcerated
population.63 Black people are also more likely to be arrested and more
likely to be arrested multiple times in the same year.64 21 percent of people
arrested once in 2017 were Black, and 28 percent arrested multiple times in
2017 were Black.65 The Prison Policy Initiative determined that “42% of
people arrested and booked 3 or more times were Black.”66
Herring makes this outsized contact with law enforcement problematic for
at least two reasons. First, extending the new good faith exception, with its
heightened fault requirement, to police officers and their support staffs
immunizes them from a wide range of errors, particularly computer errors,
which like in Herring itself, could lead to mistaken warrants, criminal
histories, or identifying information used to justify searches resulting in
illegally seized evidence. According to amicus briefs filed by the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, law enforcement relies on databases rife with
errors, and those errors spread quickly among government entities through
federal programs encouraging law enforcement cooperation.67 These
databases contain records of “incident, offense, and case reports, as well as
arrest, booking, incarceration, and parole or probation information from
federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities,” as well as personally
identifiable information.68 In a 2005 report by the Department of Justice
(DOJ), state criminal history records, which national databases collect, are
rife with significant backlogs, outdated records and records without final
dispositions; they are also infrequently audited.69 Recognizing the problem,

https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/20190314_nyclu_stopfrisk_single
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8RW-YEFE].
62. METRO. POLICE DEP’T WASH., D.C., STOP DATA REPORT: FEBRUARY 2020 9 (2020),
https://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/Stop%20Data
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF7H-GUAG].
63. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-factsheet/ [https://perma.cc/KCH4-7JBQ] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021).
64. See Press Release, Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Prison Pol’y Initiative, Arrest,
Release, Repeat: How Police and Jails Are Misused to Respond to Social Problems (Aug.
2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html [https://perma.cc/5S776W3H].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. in Support
of Petitioner at 7–8, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (No. 07-513) [hereinafter
Herring Amicus].
68. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. in Support
of Respondent at 11–12, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373) (citation
omitted) [hereinafter Strieff Amicus].
69. Herring Amicus, supra note 67, at 11. The 2005 report found a backlog of 2.5 million
records and that twenty three states had not completed full audits to verify the accuracies of
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the DOJ invested $390 million to fix these deficiencies, but its 2005 report
admitted that the influx of capital did little to remedy the problem.70 The
DOJ also recognized in 2001 that there is a “substantial risk that . . . user[s]
will make . . . incorrect or misguided decision[s]” based on these national law
enforcement databases.71 As of 2016, the reliance on computer databases
has only increased and the errors persist.72
In sum, officers are armed with immense amounts of data that can be used
during searches and seizures, and now, with Herring’s protection, they can
justify their actions with error-riddled information while facing almost no
repercussions if their actions are unconstitutional. Herring himself provides
a prime example. If not for the faulty Dale County record, he could have
avoided prosecution. The problem is exacerbated for minorities, who
disproportionately interact with law enforcement agents. More interactions,
even if they result in no formal charges, mean more opportunities for law
enforcement to collect information that could later be improperly relied on
during a search or seizure in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights.
Second, even when a defendant has a colorable suppression claim,
Herring’s heightened fault standard makes it almost impossible to vindicate
the defendant’s rights. This is because only “especially explicit and
egregious” conduct, of the type that clearly demonstrates “[c]ontempt for the
law,” will fulfill Herring’s requirement that police action be reckless,
deliberate, or grossly negligent.73 Although Herring contends that
determining whether conduct rises to this standard is an objective inquiry,74
recklessness or gross negligence necessarily requires some subjective
analysis.75 Given the Court’s established reluctance to consider subjectivity
in Fourth Amendment cases,76 defendants must have experienced a facially
flagrant constitutional violation, or marshal significant discovery to show the
police error satisfies Herring.77 Courts are unlikely to ever grant such
discovery, setting up a situation where members of minority communities—
those who are most likely to interact with police and thus most likely to suffer

their criminal records in the previous five years. Meanwhile, thirteen states reported no plans
to do an audit in the subsequent three years. Id. at 14–15.
70. Id. at 15–16.
71. Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
72. See generally Strieff Amicus, supra note 68. As of 2016, the National Crime
Information Center, a major federal database, contained more than 13 million records
accessible by organizations including state, city, tribal agencies, sentencing commissions, and
penal institutions. Id. at 8. The National Data Exchange, a central repository used by various
criminal justice entities, contained 500 million records as of 2015. Id. at 11.
73. Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1551
(2018).
74. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145–46 (2009).
75. Kerr, supra note 24, at 1105.
76. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813–14 (1996).
77. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 (2019) (demonstrating
how much discovery is required, albeit in the administrative law context, to show the
subjective decision-making processes of government officials).
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abuse—cannot in practice meet the pleading requirement despite, in theory,
having a viable claim.78
Even assuming a defendant can access the necessary evidence, Herring’s
standard impacts minorities in even more indirect ways. Herring requires
complicated legal work—properly requesting discovery, reviewing
evidence, filing the appropriate motion, and demonstrating the elements have
been met—which necessitates effective representation. While the Sixth
Amendment mandates providing criminal defendants effective counsel,79 the
considerable pressures exerted on public defenders and their clients push
cases to plea bargaining long before motions to suppress are heard.80 And
while defendants have the option of retaining private representation, doing
so is frequently unattainable, either because an individual defendant cannot
afford a lawyer or simply does not have the knowledge or support to find
one. The very people who most disproportionately interact with the criminal
justice system—members of minority communities—are also the people
faced with significant access to justice obstacles that make success for the
sliver of cases Herring left on the table unlikely.
Despite the substantial changes Herring wrought, the decision emphasizes
the traditional balance between the societal costs of suppressing evidence and
the likelihood of deterring future unconstitutional behavior that lies at the
core of exclusionary rule jurisprudence. But it does so at great harm to
communities subjected to outsized contact with law enforcement. And while
it was not the intention, Herring ultimately is another mechanism
perpetuating this problem.
PART III: WHAT TO DO ABOUT HERRING?
Herring has clearly made it difficult for a defendant to successfully
exclude evidence, and given that subsequent good faith exception cases have
approvingly cited the new standard,81 it appears Herring is here to stay. So,
what should be done? This Part highlights three avenues of exploration,
where recalibrating the scales so that police officers do not run roughshod
over constitutional rights seems at least plausible.
A: Looking Elsewhere
Because Herring is entrenched as good law,82 it may be fruitful to look
elsewhere for relief. A civil corollary to the exclusionary rule is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (§ 1983).83 Section 1983 allows individuals who suffer violations of
78. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 111, 117.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
80. The Court has acknowledged that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.” Missouri v. Frye, 556
U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (citation omitted). As a result, the Court has stated that the criminal
justice system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” Lafler v. Cooper,
556 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
81. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 239 (2011).
82. See id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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their constitutional rights committed by state officials in their official
capacities to sue for money damages or injunctive relief.84 In limited
circumstances, § 1983 allows individuals to also sue government entities,
like police departments, for money damages or injunctive relief.85 But just
as the good faith exception excuses officers for violating constitutional rights
in the exclusion context, the qualified immunity doctrine excuses officers in
the § 1983 context.86 According to that doctrine, an officer is responsible for
a constitutional violation only if the “contours of the right [were] sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing
violates that right.”87 This standard requires “exceptionally clear evidence
that a defendant’s actions were so objectively ultra vires that he or she either
knew or should have known that what he or she did was wrong,”88 which
ultimately protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.”89 While qualified immunity presents its own problems, the
trouble is compounded when considered alongside the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule will not deter police officers as evidence will almost
always be admitted, and they will not fear civil penalties under § 1983
because they enjoy qualified immunity. Taken together there is little
deterring officers from violating constitutional rights.
But, perhaps unlike the exclusionary rule, there is reason to think qualified
immunity will be reformed. Justice Thomas has repeatedly called for the
Court to review qualified immunity, arguing that the doctrine rests on rocky
jurisprudential footing.90 He has argued that the current immunity test has
no connection to the tort immunities that served as the drafting backdrop for
§ 1983.91 And further, he has asserted that good faith was not always enough
historically to protect officials from answering for their constitutional
wrongs.92 Justice Thomas is not alone—the recent events surrounding the
deaths of George Floyd93 and Breonna Taylor94 have thrust qualified
immunity firmly into the public view and inspired mainstream news outlets
to write comprehensive pieces on the doctrine.95 Such public attention,
84. Id. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
85. See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
86. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 6–9 (2017).
87. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
88. Huq & Lakier, supra note 73, at 1550.
89. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
90. See, e.g., Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1863–64 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870–72 (2017)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
91. Baxter, 140 S. Ct. at 1864 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
92. Id.
93. What to Know About the Death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/UQ57BTFK].
94. Richard A. Oppel Jr. et al., What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
6,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html
[https://perma.cc/86HB-V3MX].
95. Andrew Chung et al., Supreme Defense, REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/
[https://perma.cc/JA9V-7P98]; see also Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for
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combined with apparent judicial willingness, could create a powerful
movement to make critical changes.
Making it easier to hold law enforcement officers civilly liable for their
actions may encourage them to change their behavior to avoid liability
resulting from successful § 1983 claims. As a derivative effect, we would
see fewer Fourth Amendment violations, resulting in fewer situations in
which a defendant would face Herring’s high bar for exclusion. Some
commentators believe that officers would be sensitive to the consequences of
civil liability.96 While studies have shown that officers are not sensitive to
the financial risk,97 some evidence suggests that officers will change their
behavior if they believe a constitutional violation will result in a guilty person
going free.98 It is also worth noting that according to one study, police pay
money damages so infrequently–fewer than one half of 1 percent in a study
of forty-four major jurisdictions–99 that it is no surprise they do not fear the
monetary consequences of a § 1983 suit. If qualified immunity is relaxed so
that officers face liability more often than they do now, the financial pressure
may also lead to better police behavior.
B: Getting Back to Basics
Another approach to find relief in Herring’s wake is to challenge the
foundations on which the exclusionary rule is built. The traditional inquiry
for the rule asks whether the likelihood that excluding evidence will prevent
the undesirable constitutional violation from happening again outweighs the
intense societal cost of letting a guilty person go free.100 This analysis is
arguably a myopic one, however, as it only considers two variables; there are
potentially other societal costs to consider.
One such factor, especially in light of recent examples of social and racial
injustice, is judicial integrity. As people lose faith in the justice system, the
rule of law can falter, and data suggests that the public is at least skeptical of
our current system. According to the NAACP, 84 percent of Black adults
believe that police treat white people better than Black people, and 63 percent
of white adults agree with this opinion.101 Similarly, 87 percent of Black
adults believe the U.S. criminal justice system, which includes the judiciary,
“is more unjust towards Black people” than white people.102 61 percent of
white adults share this opinion.103
Police Emerges as Flash Point Amid Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualified-immunity.html
[https://perma.cc/W2P3-LZ4Q].
96. See Huq & Lakier, supra note 73, at 1566–68.
97. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 354–57 (2000).
98. See Huq & Lakier, supra note 73, at 1566–68.
99. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014).
100. See supra notes 17–23 and accompanying text.
101. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, supra note 63.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Including judicial integrity as part of the balancing test is not a foreign
concept, especially in the criminal law context. Judicial integrity has been
weighed in determining whether sentencing guidelines have been
miscalculated,104 whether a defendant has suffered prejudicial error at
trial,105 and even whether evidence should be suppressed.106 Scholars, too,
have proposed revamped balancing tests to better account for integrity and
fairness in the criminal process.107
Certainly, concerns about judicial integrity, coupled with the deterrent
value of exclusion, should not lead to suppression of evidence in every
instance. Instead, introducing a new variable like judicial integrity should
recalibrate the balancing test to make the process fairer. Fairness and
integrity are not simply normative values—they are cornerstones of our
Constitution.108 Vindicating constitutional rights in the correct cases, even
if they will not appreciably lead to deterrence, can instill (or rebuild) trust in
the judicial process that is critical to our core notions of the rule of law.
Decisions about exclusion do not only impact police officers.
Consequences ripple to the individuals whose constitutional rights were
infringed and those watching, who believe that excusing the “constable’s
blunder” is a failure of our system. 109 Changing the balance by considering
judicial integrity might begin to rectify the problem Herring exacerbated.
C: Taking Herring Hook, Line, and Sinker
Finally, litigants could confront Herring on its own terms. Herring made
clear that the exclusionary rule will apply when law enforcement conduct is
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent.”110 Less clear is what the Court
meant when it said that the rule applies to “systemic negligence.”111 If police
conduct will rarely satisfy the reckless, deliberate, and grossly negligent
prong, perhaps attacking instances of systemic negligence is the key. Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor foreshadowed this possibility in Evans:

104. See generally, e.g., Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018)
(considering judicial integrity in the sentencing guidelines context).
105. See generally, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266 (2013) (considering
judicial integrity when deciding whether a defendant suffered prejudicial error at trial).
106. See generally, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Court asserted that
“courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial
process” but found that this consideration is not dispositive and could not overcome the cost
of excluding the evidence. Id. at 485–86.
107. See generally, e.g., Justin Murray, Policing Procedural Error in the Lower Criminal
Courts, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1411 (2021). Indeed, Murray underscores the connections
between harmless error review and the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1448–49.
108. See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885,
1890–91 (2014) (explaining how due process can justify the exclusionary rule).
109. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1984), which evokes People v.
Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1026) (Cardozo, J.) (“The criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered.”).
110. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
111. Id.
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Surely it would not be reasonable for the police to rely, say, on a
recordkeeping system, their own or some other agency’s, that has no
mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that routinely leads to false
arrests, even years after the probable cause for any such arrest has ceased
to exist (if it ever existed).112

Justice O’Connor made her point in the context of electronic databases,
which law enforcement officials heavily rely upon despite the abundance of
errors in these databases that could easily lead to Fourth Amendment
violations.113 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion made this
point again in Herring itself.114 Nevertheless, the Court has not taken the
bait to rule that extensive errors in computer databases without attempts at
remediation qualify as systemic negligence.115 Naturally, one might ask, if
that is not systemic negligence, what is?
Despite this hazard, defining systemic negligence more precisely may be
the vulnerable underbelly to an otherwise sealed doctrine. At least in the
recordkeeping context, there is evidence to marshal a claim, and the Court
itself has intimated that computer databases contain characteristics that could
make a systemic negligence claim colorable. There may be other contexts to
pursue as well.116 Nevertheless, the evidentiary lift to succeed with this
strategy is likely significant, especially given the access to justice issues that
many criminal defendants face.117 But this small opening should still be
exploited to determine exactly where the contours of systemic negligence fit
within the exclusionary rule. It may be a fruitful way to take Herring head
on.
CONCLUSION
Despite claims that it is a logical extension of existing doctrine, Herring
changed the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule by requiring a
heightened fault standard and breaking down the law enforcement/non-law
enforcement distinction central to the Court’s previous exclusionary rule
cases. Herring’s impact is not simply doctrinal; the case disproportionately
harms minority communities. Because of their heightened contact with
police, minorities are more likely than their white counterparts to suffer a
violation of their constitutional rights. And with the high bar Herring
imposes, it is difficult to vindicate those wrongs. But Herring does not have
to be the end of the line. Litigants may try to mend exclusionary rule doctrine
112. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 17 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
113. See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
114. Herring, 555 U.S. at 155–57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even the majority accepted
that not “all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule.” Id. at
146 (majority opinion).
115. Id. at 146–47. But see United States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995, 1006 (9th Cir.
2010) (determining that a “nonchalant” attitude towards warrant applications pervading Guam
law enforcement constituted systemic negligence under Herring).
116. See generally, e.g., Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(holding that New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy was unconstitutional).
117. See supra Part II.
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by reforming related legal principles like qualified immunity; recalibrating
the balance at the core of the exclusionary rule; or working to define the
boundaries announced in Herring more clearly. While it will not be easy,
restoring balance to the exclusionary rule will help mitigate at least some of
the wrongs our country’s minorities experience at the hands of our justice
system.

